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I. INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY1 
During the last half of the twentieth century, the global 
economy has been undergoing monumental change, as the world is 
dividing into three regional economic zones: the Pacific rim; 
North America.; and, the European Community (EC). Though it is 
important to analyze the relationships between these three 
economic players, it is also ~ecessary to study the relationships 
among the member nations of each bloc to determine the effect on 
the nations participating in the bloc as well as the activities 
of the single; unit. The tight economic relationship formed when 
several sovereign nations form a union, like the EC, has a great 
impact on each country's domestic economic policies. In ~ 
Economics of European Integration, Willem Molle states that, 
Interdependence of national economies means 
that developments on the national scale are 
apt to have spillover effects in partner 
countries, each country giving impulses and 
feeling the impact of impulses in other 
countries (151). 
So, when nations form an economic union, each country'g 
domestic economic decisions affect the other nations in the 
group, as well as the union's success in achieving economic goals 
as a single unit. 
Following this idea of intra-bloc study, I focus on two 
interrelated events in this project. First, I examine inflation 
rates in the EC from 1971 through 1990. This time period permits 
me to analyze inflation rates in the EC during a period when 
three different exchange rate systems were implemented in the 
Comnrunity. Moreover, I determine one aspect of Germany's role in 
the Community, before German unification, by noting the pattern 
of inflation rates of the EC members relative to German inflation 
rates. Second, I examine the extent to which German unification 
has affect~d the pattern of inflation rates in the EC. by 
studying Ger'man and EC members' inflation ra.tes after German 
unification. 
A. HISTOR¥ OF EXCHANGE RATES IN THE Ee 
The early 1970's were not good years for the countries that 
now make up the EC, as they experienced high inflation and 
unemployment rates, along with low levels of economic growth and 
investment (Tsoukalis, 36). In April 1972, just a short time 
before the collapse of Bretton Woods in 1973, the EC implemented 
an exchange rate system to encourage exchange rate stability. 
This new system was known as the snake and its objective was to 
" ...maintain bilateral exchange rates within relatively narrow 
margins" (Tsoukalis, 36-39). The EC countries who were members 
of the snake mechanism implemented a band of 2.25%, which allowed 
the currencies to fluctuate (plus or minus 2.25%) around an 
exchange rate parity (Harrop, 181). The EC countries wanted 
exchange rate stability in order to facilitate the trade of goods 
among countries, help the EC member nations accomplish their 
individual goals of reducing domestic inflation, and provide for 
the integration of capital markets and eventually monetary union 
(Harrop, 178-179). 
However, the success of the snake was short-lived and by 
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1976, this mechanism only contained five members (W. Germany, 
Denmark, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg) and became known 
as the mini-snake (Bulmer, 63). Clearly, a new exchange rate 
mechanism had to be implemented in the Community if exchange rate 
stability was to be achieved. In 1979, the EC expanded on the 
idea of the snake mechanism and formed the European Monetary 
System (EMS); The EMS is classified as a "fixed exchange rate 
with a band" (Salvatore,611).2 
Like the snake, the EMS creates an environment for stable 
'. 
exchange rates, as well as forces "alignment of inflation rates" 
(Molle, 158-159). Though similar to the snake, the EMS differs 
in that, " ... the European Currency Unit (ECU) has replaced the 
earlier units of account ... it provides the basis of the 
divergence indicator ... it is a means of settlement between 
monetary authorities of the Community" (Harrop, 185). 
B. GERMANY AS THE EC' S TARGET ECONOMY 
Before 'German unification, which officially took place in 
1990, W. Germany was ~ main economic and policy-making force in 
the EC. This fact is noted in The Federal Republic of Germany and 
the European Community, "The Federal Republic of Germany is the 
strongest national economy in the European Cowfiunity" (Bulmer, 
1). The beginning of W. Germany's rise to power is associated 
with the establishment of the snake mechanism, and increased as 
the EC established new forms of an exchange rate mechanism 
(Tsoukalis, 38-39). In fact, according to Jeffrey Harrop, before 
unification, "W. Germany is the dominant economy in the Community 
3
 
and the pivotal force, so that economic policy in the EC is 
influenced very much by the German example" (Harrop, 207). 
During this period, W. Germany became the target economy 
with respect to inflation of the EC members for several reasons. 
First, W. Germany had a strong currency which the other economies 
could use as a peg. The EC countries wanted to use Germany's 
discipline to help control their own inflation because they knew
. 
W.Germany would not inflate. Since W. Germany would not inflate, 
the fixed exchange rate system with a band forced the other 
countries to reduce their inflation, given the large amount of 
trade between W. Germany and the other EC members. In addition, 
because the others ~ W. Germany would not inflate, they would 
begin to change their policies quickly when exchange rate 
pressures arose because they knew Germany would not change its 
policy to allow more domestic inflation. If these EC countries 
had refused to change their policies quickly, sooner or later, 
they would have had to drop out of the exchange rate mechanism. 
In addition, Germany's large economic size and wealth enabled it 
to help EC members make these adjustments. Finally, the EC 
members wanted to use W. Germany's discipline to help control 
their oml inflation, because W. Germany had strong policies to 
control its own domestic inflation (Tsoukalis, 184). 
W. Germany was successful at keeping inflation low for two 
reasons. First, Germany feared inflation as it recalled its own 
experiences of the early 1900·s. During the Weimar government, 
inflation took hold of the German economy. From 1921 through 
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1923, Germany experienced severe hyperinflation. This disaster 
began because the German government printed money in order to 
finance its expenditures. As a result, by 1923, prices escalated 
to 1.5 trillion times greater than their 1914 level (Childs, .38 
and Kohn, 1). During this period, inflation rates were rising by 
the hour, and the longer people held their cash, the more value 
it lost. Af~er its experience with hyperinflation, Germany 
deeply fea~ed the threat of inflation, so it was willing to make 
other sacrifices, such as higher unemployment, to ensure low 
rates of inflation. 
Due to its historical experiences, W. Germany established 
the Bundesbank, the central bank of W. Germany, which was made 
independent from elected government officials and from changing 
political interests (Bulmer, 62). And "By law, the primary.task 
of the central bank is to 'safeguard the currency' (prevent 
inflation)" (Sandholtz, 12). So, prior to German unification, it 
is understandable why the EC members believed Germany would not 
inflate. 
In addition, because Germany had been plagued with 
hyperinflation in the past, it took an early leadership role in 
the Community, partly to help protect its own economic interests 
while advancing the interests of the EC. For example, as early 
as 1969, W. German representatives to the EC declared that in 
order to keep inflation under control, it was first necessary to 
focus on convergence of economic factors, such as inflation, 
among EC member countries, and second, monetary union. German 
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leaders emphasized that if the EC concentrated on monetary union 
and then economic convergence, there would be a greater risk of 
promoting high inflation (Bulmer, 62-62). 
C_ GERMAN UNIFICATION 
It is understandable why the EC countries expected Germany 
to keep low inflation rates and a stable economy prio~ to 
unification. However, German unification has upset the stability 
of the German economy. Consequently, unification has cast-doubt 
on Germany's role as an economic leader in the EC. 
The momentous event of German unification actually was 
several years in the making and was realized as a legitimate 
possibility i~ the late 1980's. The speculation came true in 
July of 1990 when intra-German monetary union took place, while 
formal unification was declared on October 3, 1990 (Burstein, 
209-210) . 
Because unification was such a huge undertakiDg, it had a 
tremendous impact on the state of the economy as well as on the 
economic policies of the new country. An early effect of German 
unification was an increase in public spending. In 1991 W. 
Germany transferred nearly DM 140 billion to E. Germany in an 
attempt to rebuild and update its economy. This transfer put the 
public sector deficit at an estimated 4.5% of GNP (Barrell, 150­
153; and, The Economist, 7 Dec. 1991, 96). In addition, 
Germany's GDP growth faltered. From 1981 through 1990, W. 
Germany's average GDP growth rate was 2.3% per year. At the end 
of 1992, W. Germany's GDP growth had fallen to -0.2%, while as of 
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quarter three of 1993, it was at -1.4% (The Economist: 5 Feb. 
1994 and 20 Mar. 1993, back cover). The increase in deficit 
spending along with the need to stimulate the economy has 
resulted in.increasing levels of inflation for unified Germany, 
where quarterly annualized inflation rates have reached a high of 
nearly 8% (DSC Data Services-). 
As a result of the current German economic conditions, 
Helmut Schlesinger, head of the Bundesbank, has stated that 
Germany's top priority now is to regain a stable national economy 
and not its policy effects on EC members. Schlesinger defends 
his stance by emphasizing that, "Ther'e' s no possibility of 
helping our p~rtner countries by allowing more inflation in 
Germany" (Javetski, 34-35). This statement illustrates Germany's
./ 
current lack of control over inflation. 
I I _ THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS 
A. THEORY 
The implementation of a fixed exchange rate system is 
expected to cause inflation rate convergence in the EC. This 
expectation is based on the economic theory of fixed exchange 
rates. To understand the relationship between fixed exchange 
rates and inflation rate convergence, let us examine the 
international currency market under a pure fixed exchange rate 
system. The results can later be adapted to the EC system of a 
fixed exchange rate with a band. 
The following example explains step-by-step what happens 
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when inflation rates differ between countries which operate under 
a fixed exchange rate system. For simplicity, France and Germany 
are the only two countries in this model. Assume that France is 
experiencing a higher rate of inflation than Germany because of 
its use of expansionary monetary policy. Since prices in France 
are rising, French goods are, now relatively expensive compared to 
German goods. To French consumers, the relatively cheap German 
goods now ~ook more attractive compared to French goods, while to 
German consumers, French goods now look relatively unattractive. 
Consequently, France increases its imports from Germany. When 
French consumers buy more German goods, they need more marks in 
order to pay for them. They pay for those marks wi th francs. 
Therefore on world currency markets, demand for German marks 
increases, and supply of French francs increases. Because French 
goods are now relatively expensive to Germans, Germany decreases 
its imports from France. This decrease in French imports leads 
to a decrease in demand for French francs and a decrease in 
supply of German marks. 
The following graph represents the international currency 
market for French francs. 
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Here, the exchange rate, marks per franc, is represented on
.. 
the Y-axis~ while the quantity of francs is represented on·the 
X-axis. ER1 is the beginning exchange rate and is determined by 
the equilibrium of the. supply and demand curves for French francs 
(5 and D). As France increases its imports from Germany, its 
supply of fra~cs increases as explained above. This increase in 
supply of francs is shoM1 by an outward shift of the supply curve 
to S' _ In addition, because Germany's desire for French imports 
decreases, its demand for French francs also decreases. This is 
shown by a downward shift in the demand curve to D'. From these 
shifted supply and demand curves, the new equilibrium exchange 
rate is ER2. The value of the franc has fallen relative to the 
mark. 
If France and Germany operate under a fixed exchange rate 
system, then the exchange rate is not allowed to fall. 
Consequently, France must defend the franc, so the French 
government buys francs and sells marks. The French government 
will continue this intervention until the exchange rate returns 
to its original level, ER1. This process is shown on the graph 
by an outward shift of the demand curve, to D", which pushes the 
9
 
exchange rate backup to its original level. 
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This process of government intervention appears to be a 
feasible solution to defending a currency under a fixed exchange 
rate system, but it has one shortcoming which makes it 
impossible. The French government cannot continually buy francs 
by selling marks because it will eventually run out of marks! 
Under a fixed exchange rate system, the country with the 
higher inflation, France, has a serious problem because it· cannot 
continually defend its currency. However, the country with the 
lower rate of inflation, Germany, can intervene in this market by 
selling marks, because it will not run out of marks! 
Consequently,; France ~ be fiscally responsible and tighten its 
domestic policy in order to reduce its inflation. 
This theory demonstrates why under a fixed exchange rate 
system, countries may not have persistent differing rates of 
inflation. Although the EC does not operate under a truly fixed 
exchange rate system, this theory is still applicable to the EC 
in explaining why the inflation rates of its member nations 
should converge. Because there is a band of fluctuation around 
the fixed exchange rate in the EC, slight tempO:t'ary inflation 
rate differences may be tolerated; however, inflation rates 
should stiil converge within narrow limits. 
B. HYPOTHESES 
Due to the evolution of the exchange rate systems in the EC, 
as well as the differences in the German economy before and after 
unification, I have formed two hypotheses. First, I test the 
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hypothesis that before 1991, the implementation of a fixed 
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exchange rate system with a band in the EC along with a strong, 
stable German economy, led to inflation rate convergence by the 
EC member nations to German inflation rates. Second, I test the 
hypothesis that German unification, which has had a destabilizing 
effect en the German domestic economy through increased deficit 
spending and declining growth rates, resulted in inflation rate 
divergence. from Germany by the EC member nations, because ,the EC 
member nations can no longer be assured that Germany will 
maintain low rates of inflation. 
III. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The analysis which tests my hypotheses uses annual and 
quarterly inflation rates from 1970 through 1993. The inflation 
rates are calculated from GDP deflator data, which are taken from 
the World Tables 1992, published by the World Bank, and ISM 
Global Economic Data Base as of December 1993, published by DSC 
Data Servic~6. The hypotheses are tested by using several 
graphs, two F-tests, and one regression model. 
IV. RESULTS' 
A. FIRST HYPOTHESIS 
The results derived from testing my first hypothesis show, 
in the foliowing four graphs, that when a stable and successful 
I 
exchange rate mechanism was installed in 'the EC, coupled with a 
strong German economy, EC member nations' inflation rates 
declined and converged to German inflation rates. 
In the following graphs, part of the analysis uses a 
11 
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weighted mean of EC members' inflation rates. Only EC members 
that participated in the exchange rate system are included in the 
weighted mean. The weighted average is based upon each country's 
percentage share its currency held in the ECU basket as of 
October 1990. 3 On the following graphs, the vertical lines are 
placed on the years 1972 (snake in place); 1976 (mini-snake in 
place); 1979 (EMS in place); and 1990 (German unification) .
.. 
Figul~e 1 (p. 13), ERM Weighted Mean and German Inflat"ion 
Rates: 1971-1990, shows inflation rates of EP~ members compared 
to inflation rates of Germany. This graph shows Germany's 
success at keeping its rate of inflation low, as well as the 
decline of the ERM members' weighted mean inflation rate and 
convergence to the German inflation rate. The graph shows that 
Germany consistently ensured low rates of inflation by not 
allowing its inflation rate to rise above 8%, and for fifteen out 
of twenty years keeping it under 5%. During the ur.successful 
years of the snake (1972 to 1976), the ERM members' weighted mean 
inflation rate escalated above 16% and diverged from the German 
inflation rate. From 1976 to 1979, the mean inflation rate 
declined and began to head for the low German rate. After the 
implementation of the EMS in 1979, the pattern of decline of the 
ERM members' inflation rate is strongest. While the German 
inflation rate stayed low, the ERM members' weighted mean 
declined, re3ulting in the convergence towards the German 
inflation rate. 
Figure 2 (p.14) shows the trend of quarterly inflation rates 
from 1979 to 1990 for the ERM members and Germany. Though 
12 
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Figure 2 
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quarterly inflation rates tend to fluctuate more than annual 
• 
rates, the data show that Germany kept a low rate of inflation 
before unification. In addition, the quarterly rates for the ERM 
members started out relatively high, but moved downward towards 
the German rates. It is also seen in this graph that 
in many of the quarters, the' ERM members' and German inflation 
rate moved together. 
" 
Figure 3 (p.1S) further illustrates the convergence of ERM 
inflation rates to German rates. From 1972 to 1976, the 
difference between the ERM members' mean inflation rate and 
Germany's inflation rate diverged and over each year grew farther 
apart. From ~976 to 1979, inflation rate convergence began with 
a decline in the mean inflation rate's deviation from the German 
rate. The greatest convergence is realized in between 1979 and 
1990. Overall, the mean's deviation from Germany declined during 
this period from a high of over 7% in 1980 to a low of nearly 1% 
in 1990. The data on this graph clearly show that inflation 
rates of EC member countries converged to German rates under the 
EMS. 
Support is also found for the first hypothesis by studying 
Figure 4 (p.17). By graphing the standard deviation of inflation 
among the EC countries for each year, the conclusions from the 
previous graphs are reinforced. Again, inflation rates diverged 
from 1972 to 1976 and after 1979 began to converge. 
A statistical test of the standard deviations of inflation 
comparing the standard deviation under different exchange rate 
mechanisms confirms convergence of inflation rates. Using a two­
15 
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tailed test about variances of two populations, I compare the 
variance from the last year of each exchange rate mechanism 
(1975, 1978, and 1990). The last year is used in order to measure 
the full effect of each exchange rate system. Pairwise 
comparisons of the variances are made. The relevant F statistic 
is: F = variancet/variance~99o, where t is 1976 and 1978. 
The results of these F tests, presented in the following 
table, show that there is a statistically significant difference 
between the variances of the time periods. 
Time Period F-Statistic Significance Level 
1976 compared 7.83 0.05
 
with 1990
 
1978 compared 3.48 0.05
 
with 1990
 
The descriptive statistics shown in Figures 1 through 4, as 
well as the F test results, support my first hypothesis by 
showing a decrease in ERM members' weighted mean inflation rates; 
convergence to German rates; and, a smaller dispersion among 
rates over time. 
Because Germany kept a consistently low rate of inflation 
during this period, the EC members targeted Germany's inflation 
rates as their goal. Germany was a stable anchor to which these 
other countries could peg their inflation rates because they were 
assured Germany would not inflate. 
18
 
-B. SECOND HYPOTHESIS 
The second hypothesis states that because unification has 
had a destabilizing effect on the German economy, inflation rates 
of the EC members diverged from the German inflation rates. Each 
of the following four figures show pre and post German 
unification data. Figure 5 .(p. 20) compares ERM members' 
weighted mean inflation rates to those of Germany. After the 
1990 data,. this graph plots quarterly inflation rates, which have 
been annualized, from the first quarter of 1991 through the third 
quarter of 1993. 4 In quarter one of 1991, there was complete 
convergence of inflation rates between the ERM members and 
Germany. Fol~owing the ERM members' data through the post 
unification period shows that after a slight increase in the 
average inflation rate, it fell and held steady throughout this 
time period. By studying Germany's data, it is clear that 
Germany did not keep a steady rate of inflation after 
unification .. In fact, its inflation rate is fluctuating about 
the average ERM rate. Unlike what is present pre-unification, 
post-unificatibn Germany no longer has a consistent inflation 
rate and no longer pulls the ERM inflation rate toward its own. 
In fact, Germany's inflation rate rises above the average for the 
first time since 1971 and it is nearly 4% above the average in 
the first quarter of 1993. 
Figure 6 (p.21) also demonstrates support for the second 
hypothesis. It shows the ERM weighted mean inflation rate and 
the German rate for each quarter from 1979 to 1993. Like the 
previous graph, after unification, Germany's rate fluctuated 
19
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Figure 5 
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Figure 6 
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sporadically around the average Effi1 members' rate. Again, the 
differences between pre and post German unification are apparent. 
. 
Before unification, quarterly inflation rates of the ERM members 
were dram1 towards the lower German rates, and the inflation' 
rates between the two moved together. After complete convergence 
of these rates in quarter one of 1991, the ERM members' rates 
declined. G~rmany's inflation rates fluctuated more and were 
consistently higher than the ERM weighted mean inflation rate. 
Figure 7 (p.23) shows that after the EC implemented the EMS 
';. 
in 1979, but before German unification, there is a downward trend 
in the mean"s deviation from the German inflation rate, showing 
convergence of rates, with complete convergence occurring in the 
first quarter of 1991. After German unification, ther'e is no 
longer a trend in the ERM member~s deviation from the German 
inflation rate, which shows that after unification, Germany is no 
longer an anchor for the other EC countries. These results 
demonstrate not only the impact unification has had on Germany's 
domestic economy, but also the effect on the EC's inflationary 
trends. Before German unification, Germany's inflation rate was 
less than the mean rate. After unification, the mean inflation 
rate is less than Germany's rate, most of the time. Germany 
cannot possibly be serving as an anchor after unification. 
Figure 8 (p.24) plots the standard deviation of inflation 
rates among the ERM members from 1971 through 1993. The graph 
shows a downward trend of standard deviations beginning in 1979 
until unification. After unification, it shows an upward trend 
of standard deviations, indicating an increased dispersion of 
22 
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Figure 8 
STANDARD DEVIATION OF INFLATION
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inflation rates. 
Applying an F-statistic test of variances shows a 
statistically significant difference between the pre and post 
unificatiori variances of inflation. Because the post unification 
period has no exact ending point, I calculated one standard 
deviation by pooling data over' the last four quarters of the time 
period. (Quarter four of 1992 through quarter three of 1993.) 
For the p~e-unification time period, I calculated the data in the 
same way, by pooling from the four quarters of 1990. Here, 
F=variance1990/variance-92-93. The test yields an F-statistic of 
3.6, which is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. This 
shows that Germany is no longer the anchor for the other EC 
countries. The rates of inflation are no longer converging to 
the German inflation rate. 
A regression analysis of the standard deviation data 
confirms that the inflation rates converged until unification and 
diverged afterwards. The model is represented by the following 
equation: 
Standard Deviation = a+a1Time+~2DummY+~3(Time x Dummy) 
The following definitions explain each variable: 
1. The dependent variable is standard deviation. This 
is the quarterly standard deviation of inflation of all 
ERM countries from 1979 through 1993. 
2. a represents the constant. 
3. The Time variable is the quarters (1979-1993), 
numbered in consecutive order. 
4.	 The Dummy variable differentiates between the pre 
25 
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and post German unification years. Every quarter from 
1979 through 1990 is designated as "0", while each 
quarter from 1991 through 1993 is designated as "1". 
5. The Time x Dummy variable is the result of 
multiplying, for each quarter, the number in the Time 
variable column by' the number in the Dummy variable 
column
. 
. 
The	 fellowing table presents the regression results. 
Variable Estimated Coefficient T-Stat Prob. 
'. 
Constant(a) 1. 47109 17.0878 0.000 
Time 031.) -0.02099 6.8622 0.000 
DummY(~2) -3.92032 2.5850 0.012 
TimexDummY(~3) 0.08171 2.9019 0.005 
These results support my two hypotheses. The pre 
unification results are interpreted by examining [,31. which equals 
a standard deviation/a time. I expect [,31. to be negative because 
theory predicts that before unification, inflation rates 
converged to German rates and the dispersion among the rates 
decreased. The result is consistent with this expectation as 01. 
= -0.02099 and is significant. The post unification results are 
represented by a standard deviation/a time = [,31. + [,33. I expect 
the sum of [,31. and [,33 to be greater than zero, because Germany is 
no longer serving as an anchor after unification. Again, the 
regression results are consistent with expectations where [,33 is 
significant and the sum of [,31 (-0.02099) and ~3 (0.08171) equals 
0.06072. 
26 
The graph entitled Regression Results (p.28) depicts the 
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trend resulting from running the regression model. These data 
show that before unification, the standard deviation of inflation 
of the ERM members declined, showing a convergence of inflation 
rates among these countries. After unification (shown by the 
vertical line), an upward tr.end exists, showing an increased 
dispersion of inflation rates among the ERM countries. 
In copclusion, each graph, F-test, and regression support 
both hypotheses. Together, all of the results show Germany's 
strong presence in the EC before unification, as the anchor to 
which the other member nations' inflation rates converged. After 
unification, .the German domestic economy has undergone distinct 
changes, including increased rates of inflation relative to pre 
unification. With regard to EC members' rate of inflation, 
Germany is no longer in the anchor position it was before 
unification, and inflation rates are no longer converging to the 
German rates of inflation. 
IV . CONCWSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The results confirming the first hypothesis show that as a 
stable exchange rate mechanism was put into place in the EC, 
coupled with a strong German economy, that inflation :r'ates 
declined; the dispersion among the rates grew smaller; and, 
inflation rates of the EC members converged to the low German 
inflation rates. These results support the idea that Germany 
served as an anchor for the EC countries. The results also 
confirm the second hypothesis. EC countries' inflation rates 
diverged from the German rates after unification. There was 
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increased dispersion among inflation rates. These results 
support the idea that Germany is no longer the anchor, with 
respect to inflation for the EC countries. 
Several questions and implications arise from this lack of 
German economic leadership in the Community after unification. 
One result of Germany's decreased leadership status is that the 
EC's economic and policy making system will become more 
symmetricaf' Though the EC communities may be adversely affected 
in the short~run as a result of these hardships in unified 
Germany, some believe that they may gain more long-term decision­
making power in the EC, causing a greater community--wide 
coordination of policies (Tsoukalis, 205; and, Templeman, 51­
54). 
Perhaps one of the most critical issues resulting from this 
diminution of German leadership deals with the future of the EC. 
More specifically, because Germany is focusing more on national 
interests than on its EC economic interests, is it possible for 
monetary union to be implemented in the Community by the proposed 
deadline if there is no economic leader in the EC? Due to the 
range of problems in the EC, a committee decided in early August 
1993 to abandon the 2.25% band of the ERM and switch to a 15% 
band. This move could inhibit the final phase of monetary union, 
which is scheduled to take place in 1997. For this union to take 
place, a prerequisite was established stating that currencies are 
required to stay in the 2.25% band for at least two years prior 
to union (The Economist, 7 Aug. 1993, 21-22). Because of these 
most recent economic events, it seems the continued integration 
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-of the EC is in question. 
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1. I sincerely appreciate the efforts of the following people 
without whom the completion o~ this research project would not 
have been possible. Dr. Pamela Lowry, Assistant Professor of 
Economics, directed the independent study portion of this 
research, as well as offered her expertise in the field of 
International Economics throughout the entire project. Dr. 
Michael See~org, Chair of the Department of Economics, supervised 
. 
this project in its early stages while teaching the Senior 
Project class. Thanks also go to Dr. Margaret Chapman, Associate 
Professor of Economics, and Dr. James Simeone, Assistant 
Professor of Political Science, members of my honors research 
faculty committee, who continually offered guidance and 
suggestions during this project. And a special thanks goes to 
Dr. Robert Leekley, Associate Professor of Economics, for his 
help in developing the regression model used· in this research 
project. 
2. The term fixed exchange rate with a band is taken directly 
from International Economics, by Dominick Salvatore. The 
following example illustrates how this type of exchange rate 
mechanism works, when the band of fluctuation is 1%. 
Ex (~) 
20.2­
?Qr Value- =2:00 
I, q r; 
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3. The following table lists each country's percentage share in 
the ECU basket as of October 1990 (Harrop, 186). 
Germany 30.4% 
France 19.3% 
UK 12.6% 
Italy 9.9%
 
Netherlands 9.5%
 
Belgium 8.2%
 
Spain 5.2%
 
Denmark 2.5%
 
Ireland 1.1%
 
Portugai 0.8% 
Greece 0.7% 
LlLxembourg 0.3% 
4. The formula for annualizing quarterly rates of inflation is 
as follows (Kohn, 125). 
(l+periodic rate )PQr:1odQ pQr YQar = -l+effective annual rate 
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Ann C. Chalstrom 
Honors Research Proposal 
The Effect of German Unification on Inflation Rates in the 
European Community 
In my research honors project, I will examine the 
inflation rates of the member~ of the European Community 
before and after German unification. Specifically, I will 
show how the inflation rates of the other members converged 
with Germany's before urtification. (Before this, Germany 
had low inflation and the other members had ~igh inflation; 
so, they tied their economies to a strong German economy to 
help bring inflation under control.) I will then examine 
the consequence of German unification on the inflation rates 
of these countries. The main research hypothesis to be 
tested is that Germany lost its ability to keep the 
inflation rates of other EC countries in line with its own. 
(i.e. There was inflation rate diversion after unification.) 
The first step in testing this hypothesis is to collect 
macro economic data for EC countries, especially data on 
inflation rates. Most of the data is available from World 
Bank publications. The second step is to develop empirical 
models which correlate how closely other EC countries' 
inflation rates followed German rates before and after 
unification. The models will attempt to explain trends in 
the average European inflation rate as well as trends in the 
variation of inflation rates between EC countries. The main 
statistical techniques will be correlation analysis and 
regression analysis. 
